

East European Quarterly, XXXI, No. 2
June 1997

IDEAS ABOUT, AND REACTIONS TO MODERNIZATION IN THE BALKANS

Roumen Daskalov
University of Sofia

It is my purpose in this paper to consider how development was thought about and imagined on the Balkans from the middle of the nineteenth century to World war II.¹ I am particularly interested in modernizing ideologies, i.e., such that viewed modernization in a certain formulation as highly desirable and strove to bring it about or to accelerate it. I am especially interested in the competition between alternative views on modernization, differing in the general direction or emphasis or in the view on the pace of development (rapid change versus continuity). Lastly, I am interested in altogether negative reactions (of rejection) towards modernization. I will consider the modernization "projects" (or visions) of nationalism (with its subsequent national-statist development), of liberalism, socialism, agrarianism and some negative responses of a more literary character (of romantic poets, Slavophiles, populists, of what can be termed "autochtonism" and of fascism). While not every intellectual current had a fully elaborated view on modernization, all took part in the debate on the vital issue of development and had something distinctive to say about it.

It was the contact with (Western) Europe, experienced as more advanced and superior, that posed the problem of development ("progress," modernization) to the Balkan peoples under the reign of two empires (the Ottoman and the Habsburg). The impact of the Enlightenment (and of the French revolution) was first felt among the Greeks, the Rumanians and the Serbs under Habsburg rule because of more favorable geographic location, trade relations (the Greek trade colonies acting as outposts in the West) and closer cultural and educational ties with the West. The merchant Diaspora of the Balkan peoples played an outstanding role as a mediator.² The influence of the Enlightenment in the stricter sense was confined to intellectual circles among the Greeks and the peoples under Habsburg domination and to single intellectuals of the peoples under Ottoman domination. But it exerted a more diffuse influence and precipitated

a sort of popular self-education movement among the Bulgarians and the Serbs under Ottoman domination, in Bosnia and Macedonia.³ Due to the European influence the Balkan peoples increasingly turned away from Eastern orthodoxy with its restricted religious education and were introduced to a new age of secularism and nationalism.

Consonant with the Enlightenment belief in the advance of Reason was the idea of a unitary, goal-oriented change, conducting from a more primitive to a more "advanced" state of the society. For the elites of the Balkan peoples, deeply impressed with the achievements of Western Europe, she was a naturally given paragon of "progress." One can find in the writings of the time the metaphoric vision of a single path of "progress" with all nations marching along it and finding themselves at different points, the (West) European nations at the head of this march.⁴ Especially at the early stage, modernization was equated to "Europeanization" and sometimes defined more generally as "civilization." At a most general level "progress" meant "reason," "knowledge," "education," "science." The Balkan observers saw its particular manifestations in the advance of technology, the growth of industry and commerce, of material well-being but also in the establishment of political democracy, citizen rights and freedoms.⁵ One may speak about a proto-project of modernization in the Balkans under diffuse Enlightenment influences, with knowledge and education as leading ideas.

Under conditions of foreign domination on the Balkans, the idea of development and progress became closely associated, and in fact inseparable, from the project of **nationalism**. Ottoman (Turkish, "Asian") backwardness, the presumable immutability and lack of potential for development of the empire were opposed to progress and development, which were associated in their turn with Europe; the contrast had strong emotional and moral overtones, with the Ottomans standing also for subjugation of peoples and despotic rule, superstition and religious fanaticism, the corruption of moeurs, etc. The Ottoman invasions in Europe were seen as an intrusion of an alien body into the European civilization and culture, and the national activists wanted to see the Ottoman Turks expelled from Europe back into Asia – a term with a strongly negative value connotation in this usage. The overthrow of the foreign rule and the achievement of political independence came to be seen as *conditio sine qua non* of progress. Only the establishment of independent

nation-states could serve as an institutional framework within which development could take place, while to remain in the empire would be detrimental to progress. The desire for progress and human dignity, on the one hand, and liberation and national independence, on the other hand, mutually reinforced their attraction.⁶

While Europe was admired by the nationalist Balkan activists as an image of progress, their political aspirations introduced a certain ambivalence in the attitude toward her. To the extent that "Europe" (i.e., the European great powers) defended the integrity of the Ottoman empire and the status quo, Balkan national leaders often accused her of supporting serfdom and despotism on the Balkans. The subjugated Balkan ethnicities turned increasingly toward Russia which was not as developed as the West but whose interests of dominating the Straits and establishing her influence on the Balkans, came in clash with the existence of the Ottoman empire.

The economic and cultural impact of (Western) Europe on the Balkans produced its first apprehensions and tensions in the epoch of the struggles for national liberation. Contemporaries saw the European influence mainly as an intrusion of new "vogues" into the domestic sphere and the traditional ways of life. Among the borrowings and adaptations in the domestic sphere were the introduction of European-style furniture (tables, chairs, beds to replace the low Oriental furniture), European clothes, novel notions about hygiene as well as changes in mentality and behavior, especially some mundane manners and styles, forms and ceremonies of social life (such as walks for pleasure, public lectures, receptions, parties, music and dances different from the traditional folk ones, amateur theater, etc.).⁷ As the innovations came most frequently from France – a leading civilizing force in Europe of the nineteenth century – the Europeanization of the Ottoman empire came to be known as "alla franga" vogue, meaning "on the French" (model), whatever the original source.

The impact provoked a strong traditionalist ("conservative") reaction, which assumed accordingly the form of critique of the vogues. Authors of this persuasion saw in the intrusion of the European vogues and the "monkish" imitation of the West a sign of corruption of the moeurs and a threat to their people's moral. They argued their point in an edifying tone, as in the following passage, written by the Bulgarian Revival activist Petko R. Slaveikov:

The more we advance in our so-called civilizing and tinting in the same hue as Europe and the more we also learn together with the study of foreign languages, the specific life of the older nations, the more we can see how the simplicity and the sobriety that characterized previously our private life vanish around us. The blind striving to imitate the foreigners and to become exactly as they are, has made us dislike everything ours, and contemptuous of our own ways... The desire and the diligence of our nation to educate itself, its love for everything new, when unaccompanied as it is by the requisite strict religious and moral instruction, are being turned into tools of dissolution and corruption, instead of becoming tools of moral improvement....⁸

The process of Europeanization – a very slow one at this stage (though it may have been perceived as quick) would not have been felt as so threatening if a danger to the national consciousness were not sensed in it, in precisely the period when the Balkan nations were being created and consolidated. Little wonder that the outcry was loudest among the national revivalist activists, who had undertaken the task of “awakening” the national consciousness. One should note the peculiar ambiguity and inner split in the position of many Balkan “enlighteners” or “awakers” who were at once admiring European culture (being often themselves educated in countries of Western Europe) and worried by the “contamination” of the people with foreign influences, sensing a threat to the burgeoning national consciousness. Of course, Europe was not the only form of “otherness” on the Balkans, the major one being “the Turk,” but cultural differentiation and even opposition was considered indispensable in this instance as well.⁹

As Raymond Crew rightly points out, it is because nationalism contained “a promise of modernization” that the ideology of national identity had to define its relationship to the cosmopolitan claims of the Enlightenment, and of liberalism. The relationship of national identity to the larger unity of European culture could thus become a vital practical as well as intellectual concern in all Eastern Europe.¹⁰ Here is an early Bulgarian testimony (stemming from the 1870s) that nationalism and Europeanism (or cosmopolitanism) were felt as co-existing rather uneasily and the “solutions” proposed to the dilemma sounded at times really casuistic:

The so-called cosmopolitans, i.e., those aspiring to equal civil rule for all the world, have of lately proclaimed themselves against the love of the fatherland. Every good person cannot but wish for the success of equal civil rule, but isn't it too early yet for mankind to attempt this leap and why should we wait for the outcome of the efforts undertaken to that purpose. Besides, we think that in order to go that far, one has to pass first through the love for the fatherland and for one's own people rather than the other way round; and this is certainly so, for how may someone love the whole world and all men, if one has not learned to love one's fatherland and one's own people in the first instance?¹¹

Characteristic of this statement is not only the affirmation of the priority of the national over the civil and the universal, but the very dramatization of the relationship between them. Let me point out that a contradiction between national and cosmopolitan, or, in more abstract terms, between particular and universal, never arose for the leading nations who had achieved a surer sense of national identity and had already experienced the transformation from folk cultures to national (high) cultures. The question simply could not arise for a country like France which had managed to elevate its culture as a paragon of universality and had imposed it with greater or lesser success on others.

The ambiguous attitude is further revealed by the fact that the European influence was seldom criticized directly, especially at this early stage. The critiques were rather directed at the superficial and "distorted" adaptation of the Western "civilization" by assuming only the appearances, without absorbing the contents. One may read in the very term "alla franga" (on the French manner) the implication that the copying of foreign vogues was perceived as awkward and superficial, a mere caricature of the imitated pattern. One of the first Bulgarian dramas is characteristically entitled "Krivorazbranata tsivilizatsia" (in translation literally: The Wrongly Understood Civilization). The author - Dobri Voinikov - made clear in the introduction his intention to criticize exactly such a turned-over-head notion of "Europeanness," where "the consequence is mistakenly taken to be the cause, the reflection to be the light itself and the appearance to be the essence," "the vogue is substituted for the civilization."¹² There are many other examples of satirizing the

wrong understanding of the European civilization by appropriating fashions and manners only.¹³

One may speculate on the question whether this type of critique targeted merely the type of "acculturation" (as anthropologists might put it), or the influence itself, because it was feared that any influence might shatter the incipient national self-consciousness. One may suspect that the high and unquestionable prestige of Europe at that time left open only the indirect way of expressing concern about it by lamenting a deficient implementation. Whatever the answer to this, it attests to an inner split and uneasiness in the attitude towards things "European."

What is now called the "demonstration effect" has been at work on the Balkans since the early nineteenth century.¹⁴ It consists in the fostering, through comparison with the more advanced societies, of new consumer tastes and of new life-styles in the peripheral societies. The striving for their satisfaction ruins individual people, exasperates social and political struggles and puts a strain upon weak economies. The impossibility to satisfy such expectations leaves disgruntled people. The underdeveloped country thus becomes caught up into a sort of trap, irrespective of the actual pace of the development or even in inverse proportion to it. An awareness of the ruinous effect of the new "consumer" aspirations given the modest economic capacities of the Balkan societies, is felt in the following bitter words (addressed ironically at the countrymen):

Because the Europeans have this all and live that way, so should we, in order to be civilized like them, have the same and live in the same manner! But the Europeans know how to build factories and to produce various nice, shiny, beautiful things! Why worry, we shall buy them at a very high price and make ourselves beautiful with them. And also they know how to build steam-propelled ships and railroads; why worry, we shall pay them and move on.¹⁵

That the aspirations for an European style of life in the absence of comparable resources has adverse social consequences, did not pass unnoticed, too. It is, so the argument goes, the pursuit after higher European standards of living that conducts to the degradation of public morals, to roughness and lack of civility on the public scene; it is also to blame for the particularly savage character

of the political struggles and the corruption of the public servants, etc.¹⁶

With the establishment of independent Balkan states in the second half of the nineteenth century, the modernization process entered a second – **national-statist** – phase.¹⁷ With certain delays and differences in time, all new states embarked upon a policy of development and modernization. The state pursued economic policies of protectionism and encouragement of the infant industries; it took on itself the task of building up an infrastructure (and especially railways), the centralization and homogenization of education, etc. I will not deal here with the actual results of these policies.¹⁸ For the present purposes it is important to note that certain contradictions between nationalism and modernization, which remained hidden in the previous epoch, came to the fore at this point. The role of the state in substituting for lacking prerequisites of economic development in particular proved to be an extremely dubious affair. As pointed out by a number of authors, state intervention in the economy was of little help in the formation of an autonomous national entrepreneurial classes and lead to a proliferation of corrupt administration trafficking in influence. Business and the expanding bureaucracy established a close parasitic relationship.¹⁹ It was not business but civil service that was most attractive; education was pursued with the express purpose of procuring an office in the state apparatus.²⁰ The civil service expanded to accommodate the numerous office-seekers, especially people of some education. Capitalism in its turn lived in a largely parasitic relationship with the state and relied on various state opportunities: state deliveries and monopolies, tax exemptions and other privileges. The state itself was in fact the greatest capitalist; autonomous, broadly-based capitalism could hardly develop.²¹ Thus even if the professed intentions of the state were to “modernize” the country, its activities did actually create serious impediments to development.²²

Most importantly, with national unification and national grandeur taken up by political leadership in all Balkan states as a major goal, nationalism became an end in itself and subordinated the project of modernization.²³ The bulk of the national resources went into the military sphere to the neglect of the economy (and agriculture in particular), of social improvements (the remedy of extreme poverty, the bettering of health conditions, etc.) and of the educational sphere.²⁴ Promising investments for future development

were forgone and meager national resources and energies were dissipated in a disproportionate military built-up and the series of wars (especially the Balkan wars in 1912-1913, and the two world wars). When carried out to such extremes, nationalism proved most fatal to the development of the small Balkan states.

The state-nationalist perspective dramatized the attitude of the Balkan elites towards Europe and the modernity it exemplified. The situation led to ironic outcomes in the international relations of the Balkan states where irredentism and the pursuit of national greatness (at the expense of one's neighbors) could well end into subservience to some of the European great powers.²⁵ Characteristic of the Balkan states, as it seems to be often the case of small states with negligible influence upon the international environment, was the constant concern with national security and the search for a mighty protector among the European great powers.²⁶ The positive orientation ("philia") towards one European power (or alliance of powers) and the "phobia" to others constituted a major defining feature of most Balkan political parties, and could coexist with most vehement professions of patriotism. This was possible because nationalism targeted primarily neighboring countries or national minorities; on the broader international arena it was constrained to maneuvering between the powers, eventually exploiting their contradictions to one's own advantage on the local arena.

The situation of the cultural elites was no less ambiguous (though of less political consequence). What had to be the relationship between a national culture and the European cultural influence? The crux of the matter was how to balance the national cultural tradition against the foreign, mainly European influences in literature, poetry, drama, painting and music (in brief: native versus foreign); then how to link the folklore tradition with the modern trends (tradition versus modernity); besides, along with modernization high culture developed as urban and contrasted dramatically with the predominantly agrarian surrounding milieu (urban versus agrarian). The educated strata on the Balkans (the so-called "intelligentsia") were divided between the "Westerners" and "autochthonists." Especially the literary (artistic) intelligentsia was divided into "modernists" ("Europeanists," "cosmopolitans"), who professed a faith in "modernity" (meaning here urban and European standards) and aspired to "universal values," and those who put the stress on the "native" (idealized historical past and folk culture); the

former were mostly "individualists" while the latter undertook to express the feelings and concerns of "the people."²⁷ The most enthusiastic Europeanists among the Balkan intelligentsia perceived themselves as *Kulturträger*, having a special mission in Europeanizing their societies.²⁸ However, I do not want to create a purely "idealistic" impression about the disputes. Intellectual domination, social prestige and material gains were at stake as well, and the sociological dynamics of groups and generations goes a long way in accounting for attitudes and ideas.

The growing gap between the Europeanized cultural elites (the intelligentsia) and the vast (then peasant) majority was painfully experienced and became a much debated problem.²⁹ The "Europeanized" intelligentsia was exposed to attacks (issuing partly from its own ranks) for losing contact with "the people," for undermining religion and the people's moral and for betrayal of the national ideals. The tensions of this position were experienced most keenly by a section of the intelligentsia which was immersed in (West) European culture and aspired to universalism and modernity in its contemporary Western shape, while remaining sincerely nationalist in feeling. This was especially the case where the "populist" tradition of the time of the national struggles was strong (Serbia and Bulgaria).

Theoretically, the dilemmas appear now as false, or too global and undifferentiated in order to be resolved anyway, and even then there were attempts to mediate and compromise between them. Thus a more balanced opinion would be, on the one hand, against closure to foreign influences and isolation within the "native," while being, on the other hand, against the uncritical reception of these influences. The interaction with foreign cultures would be asserted only on condition that what is borrowed is subjected to a creative reworking. The native (national) culture would still present the supreme value and the way to humanity would be said to pass necessarily through authentic national creativity.³⁰ This was often accompanied by an awareness of the dangers for small and culturally belated nations in their contact with mature cultures. In practice, even emphatic rejection of the Western cultural impact could coexist with actual borrowing of ideas.

The theoretical problem with its barren dichotomies would hardly be worth mentioning were it not the expression of deeper and vital concerns of the educated strata. The experiences of the educated

and of the (partly coinciding with them) political elites with Westernization were ambiguous and confusing. "Europeanization" of the elites, whether the European styles and values were deeply appropriated or just superficially imitated, resulted in estrangement from the more traditional strata of their own societies, dissatisfaction with the pace of development and the prevailing native conditions, a perception of cultural "backwardness" or "provincialism." But "Europe" remained distant and often disdaining either, frustrating aspirations and producing resentment; though it could serve its prestige social function within the "native" society, feelings toward it in the practical encounters could be ambiguous at best. The situation may be described as a sort of cultural anomie of people suspended halfway between two worlds and their values, feeling nowhere "at home."³¹ It is only against this experiential background that the recurrence of the issue and the bitterness of the debate may be understood. The naive belief in the West characteristic of the first period of the familiarization was shattered. There occurred, in the words of Andrew Janos, a decline of the "collective charisma of the Occident" and of the magnetism of its institutions.³² The apprehensions *vis-à-vis* the West were reinforced by the fact that it was becoming increasingly nationalistic during the interwar years, and that it seemed overcome by internal crises.

In view of this dual and uneasy situation of the elites, it is hardly surprising that the impact of the West would often elicit a reaction of rejection, which could then be experienced as a salutary reconciliation with their own "people" and nation. I will postpone until the second part of this essay the consideration of the negative nationalist reaction to Westernization (and modernization) which may be designated as "autochtonism." I will now turn to the consideration of the political ideologies of liberalism, socialism and agrarianism in their relevance to the problems of modernization.

Let's now turn to the **liberal** project of modernization. During the pre-liberation period, liberalism and nationalism were closely linked. The fact that liberalism contained the idea of a freer and more fair society, and of liberty from foreign oppression and a national self-rule in particular, appealed to Balkan political activists. Besides, Western liberalism at this classical (early to middle of the nineteenth century) stage was still attacking the established autocratic powers and its generous, freedom-loving aspects dominated; in its turn nationalism, directed against foreign domination, was a just and

“progressive” cause.³³ Many Balkan national revolutionaries were particularly drawn to the radical republicanism in the European political tradition, though upon liberation constitutional monarchies were actually established. Western liberal ideas could be used as a weapon against different enemies, acquiring at times really strange meanings. Thus the principles of political liberalism and popular sovereignty meant little for the agrarian society of the Danubian Principalities before 1848 but they were taken up by certain groups to fight their opponents or oppressors: by a group of boyars, who wanted to get rid of the Phanariot rulers and to replace them with native Rumanian princes, by another group who wanted to make the Principalities into a republic, and by leaders of the peasantry as slogans against landowners and tax-gatherers.³⁴

The liberal project in its original formulation in the West was concerned with the establishment of constitutional government: a proper balance of powers and limitations to royal authority (and government in general), guaranteed citizen rights and freedoms and national self-determination. It was in favor of the industrial and urban road of development and became the exclusive ideology of the bourgeoisie in ascendance. Liberalism supported mass education and a free press (as long as it remained in the hands of the “respectable” propertied classes) and the separation between Church and state. These principles were espoused by the liberal parties in the Balkan states as well. But the Balkan liberals deviated from such principles of classical liberalism as the laissez-faire economic policies and took recourse to strong Listian protectionism of the national industry while distrusting foreign capital. This was especially true of the Rumanian National Liberal party, lead by the Bratianu brothers (known for the “prin noi insine” – “through ourselves” economic policy of Vintila Bratianu).³⁵ All Balkan states reverted sooner or later to policies of protection of the infant national industries while the economic nationalism between the wars went a good way towards autarky.³⁶ In general, unlike Western liberalism which tried to keep the amount of state intervention at minimum, liberals on the Balkans were using the state as instrument of intervention in the economy and for furthering their personal and party interests.³⁷

It is a matter of dispute to what extent (and whether at all) one can properly speak about liberalism on the Balkans, especially as a practice.³⁸ Sure, most of the Balkan nation-states adopted liberal constitutions; thus the Bulgarian constitution of 1879, modeled on the

constitution of Belgium, was one of the most "progressive" of the times. But such achievements of Western liberalism as constitutional government: secret ballots, freedom of speech, press and association, etc., were tramped upon in the Balkans, that political parties there, even if they called themselves "liberal," were not concerned with the implementation of principles and programs but only with the spoils of office; that, contrary to laissez-faire economic policy usually associated with Western liberalism, state intervention prevailed, and that all this compromised liberalism to the point of rendering it meaningless: a demagogic phraseology. There have been, on the other hand, attempts to vindicate Balkan liberalism by comparing it not primarily with classical (mid-nineteenth century) liberalism but rather with a later brand of Western liberalism.³⁹ Regardless of the corruption of the liberal principles, so the argument goes, liberal elites in the peripheries remained committed to material progress by industrialization and did not dispose with legal and institutional constraints to state power altogether.⁴⁰

What matters most is why liberalism became "perverted" or compromised in the Balkan context. An explanation that goes beyond the obvious selfishness on the part of Balkan politicians will have to take into account the widely divergent socio-economic conditions on the Balkans: economic backwardness, self-subsistent agrarian societies, negligible industrial (entrepreneurial) bourgeoisie. In general, the liberal credo (and parties) in the Balkans preceded the formation of wider industrial bourgeoisie. Unlike in the West, where liberalism was the ideology of entrepreneurs (agrarian or commercial) who wanted freedom to pursue their affairs, in the European East it became the ideology of a political class, trying to compensate for the weakness of economic entrepreneurship while interested above all in its own accommodation and well-being.⁴¹ This made Rumanian liberals, for example, turn toward the state as an instrument for change with the consequence of far-reaching parasitic overlapping between business and bureaucracy. The result was that when the liberals tried to create such a class by political intervention, they had to tramp upon the interests of the overwhelming agricultural majority, which was made to pay for a dubious industrial development and narrow financial interests.⁴² The lack of a wide-based industrial development also meant that the commercial-industrial bourgeoisie could not appear as the most productive class, the carrier of progress, hence liberalism could not generalize

bourgeois claims and further bourgeois interests in the name of progress. This could only be done by strained arguments, political maneuver and electoral perversion (as the electorate consisted largely of peasants), facilitated by the illiteracy and poverty of the vast majority of the population. The tradition of nationalism and the situation of belated modernization in a milieu of more advanced states pressed for defection from laissez-faire and free trade liberalism (which characterized later-day Western liberalism as well).

The case of liberalism presents an opportunity to reflect upon the outcome of taking over a modernizing ideology tailored on different realities. If such ideology is given a chance of political application under basically different conditions – as with the constitutional establishment of liberal democracy in most Balkan states – reinterpretation and “perversion” are certain to occur. There are limits of what a (political and economic) ideology can achieve in inadequate socio-economic conditions: strong and independent bourgeois classes cannot be created by means of political intervention. Moreover, under divergent conditions an ideology may produce unexpected (in this case un-Western) consequences: the use of state power for furthering narrow group interests (of the political class of office-holders and their industrial clientele) instead of the professed purposes of fostering wide-based industrialism. A case can be made for the idea that even if (political) liberalism remains initially a purely formal framework, it can be made effective in the course of time, when wider strata begin to press for their rights and demand political participation. It is another question – an empirical one – to what extent (political) liberalism managed to strike roots in the history of the Balkan states before World War II; imperfect as it might have been, liberal democracy certainly had its short periods of in most of the Balkan countries. As an economic doctrine, laissez-faire liberalism had a limited implementation in the Balkans (though one may argue that inadequate tariff protection was tantamount to free trade).

The **Socialist** movements in the Balkan countries had their roots in the earlier liberalism and “radicalism,” under strong Russian influence.⁴³ In fact, the first Balkan socialists were colorful figures whose teachings presented a mixture of liberal, populist, anarchist and socialist ideas. Thus Serb socialism originated in the radical ideology of Svetozar Markovich (1848-1875), who became for a time attracted to Bakunism and later turned decisively to “scientific social-

ism" and radical populism. Like the Slavophiles and the Populists he believed that "young peoples" can develop without passing through industrial capitalism and that the "basic institutions" of Slavic society – the Russian *mir* or *obshtina* and the *zadruga* or extended family of the South Slavs – could be turned into instruments of socialization (and serve the transformation of agriculture along socialist lines in particular). He outlined a program of political decentralization and a program of economic confederation of producer's cooperatives hoping that this would curb the influence of bureaucracy and the centralized nation state.⁴⁴ Only gradually did Balkan socialism evolve into a "purer" form but then also there were always deviations from what asserted itself as the orthodoxy. The division into "narrow" and "broad," originating in the history of the Bulgarian socialists,⁴⁵ and pointing to the sharp disputes about the legitimate latitude in the interpretation of the doctrine, can be extended to other Balkan states as well.

Marxist Socialism was most radical of all ideologies of modernization in the sense of demanding a decisive break from contemporary realities. At the turn of the century the peasant states in the Balkans had a very different outlook from what was presupposed by the doctrine, tailored on the Western societies with developed industries and broad working classes. The pioneer of "scientific socialism" in Bulgaria – Dimitur Blagoev – undertook to "prove" the appropriateness of the Socialist agenda to the local conditions in a brochure, characteristically entitled "What is Socialism and is there Soil for it at Home?"⁴⁶ The deciphering of the preconceived trend of the future – concentration of land property and proletarianization – required a good deal of misrepresentation of the contemporary socio-economic realities of peasant smallholders and craftsmen.⁴⁷ Under so different conditions in the East, Marxist ideas were bound to result in either rigid dogmatism or they had to be altered substantially in order to make an accommodation to the more striking differences in the realities of life. The less dogmatic socialists thus mixed socialism with other ideas, especially populism and agrarianism. As David Mitrany keenly noted: there is a "significant parallelism between population and doctrine: the more numerous the peasants the greater the defection from the Marxist school: in the West many peasants and revisionism, in the East mostly peasants and, as a consequence, Populism."⁴⁸

Industrialization stood first and foremost in the Socialist ideas about modernization.⁴⁹ Only large scale industrialization and concentration of the land in big units was to bring about the social preconditions: polarization into bourgeoisie and proletariat (urban and rural), needed for the mobilization of the working class and the establishment of the new order. As A. Gerschenkron noted, in his enthusiasm for industrial capitalism (and readiness to use the tools of governmental policy to bring it about) the Bulgarian socialist Blagoev surpassed even bourgeois businessmen like Ivan E. Geshov, known for his support of the policies of "encouragement" of industry.⁵⁰ A corollary of this attitude was that the most orthodox Socialists were indifferent to the fate of the peasants and the artisans. As they considered them "conservative," an obstacle to "progress" and doomed to disappearance anyway, they did not see any point in trying to alleviate their situation.⁵¹ The social realities on the Balkans made the socialists contradict the doctrine in many respects. The proletariat being small and only a fraction of it being employed in modern enterprises, the Socialist parties had to face the problem of allowing propaganda and recruitment among non-proletariat milieus – among the intelligentsia and the "petty bourgeoisie," i.e., teachers, artisans, retail traders, rank-and-file civil servants, etc. A further irony of early Balkan socialism was the fact that it was more powerful in Bulgaria and Serbia – least developed industrially at the turn of the century, than in Rumania and Greece. In the years following the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the left wings of the Balkan Social-Democratic parties developed into Communist parties (in Bulgaria in 1919, Rumania – 1921, Greece – 1924).⁵² The Russian (Soviet) model of development with heavy industrialization and collectivized agriculture, planned economy under centralized supervision, was then unquestionably accepted as a model for the future. It was to determine the actual policies adopted after the Communist advent to power in Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (though not in Albania).

Socialism was an imported ideology and the one most ill-suited to the contemporary Balkan socio-economic conditions. Writing on the perception of change in Latin America, Albert Hirschman remarked that imported ideologies display some interesting qualities: their great initial disparity from the structural conditions in the importing country obstructs the perception of change (and the adequate perception of reality in general), paradoxically, this gives them

a greater chance of survival.⁵³ With socialism in the Balkans we have a case in point, though the deception about the realities went here in the opposite direction – more, rather than less change was seen. Because of the desire to see things progressing in a certain direction, the enduring existence of smallholders and artisans was ignored or played down while a proletariat was conjured into existence. Leaving apart the sociological reasons for the survival of a dogmatic faith (the conditions that favored leftism and extremist movements in general), it is easier to overlook, as Hirschman suggests, the great disparities of an imported ideology with indigenous realities than very small misfits of an indigenous ideology with the surrounding conditions. A doctrine that gives free rein to the imaginative manipulation of the realities can eventually produce a more radical action for change with little attention to social consequence, especially if combined with a faith in the “iron laws of history.” Gerschenkron put it nicely: “Few things are more apt to enhance men’s willingness to promote a certain course of events than the firm belief in its inevitability.”⁵⁴

An alternative vision of the development was presented by **agrarianism** (or peasantism) – the ideology of the peasant political movement. This was the ideology most attuned to conditions on the Balkans at the end of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. It was premised upon the existence of a numerous peasantry and on the assessment that this situation was going to remain so for at least the near future. As the leading theoretician of the Rumanian Populists Constantin Stere (affiliated with the peasant party) described differences East and West: “The burning social problem which the West has to face as a result of capitalist development and the industrialization of modern production does not yet confront our society, or confronts it in a totally different form – namely, as a peasant question, in all its extent and variety, and not as a proletarian question, as in the West.”⁵⁵ Since peasants were the majority (reaching 4/5 of the total population) and played such an important economic role, the agrarianists considered that they should be given adequate political representation. According to them, there could be no real democracy unless the peasant majority of the population exercised political rights.⁵⁶ In his estate doctrine A. Stamboliiski – the leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) – went further and argued against the traditional political parties in favor of representation along professional and occupational lines.⁵⁷

Agrarianism was concerned with improving the conditions of the peasants, especially of those who needed support most badly – the smallholders and the landless rural proletariat. In Eastern Europe, as pointed out by David Mitrany, the agrarian problem was not regarded as a Land Question, like in the West, but primarily as a Peasant Question, i.e., the subject (the peasant) had precedence over the object (the land): accordingly, considerations of social policy subordinated questions of technical or economic efficiency.⁵⁸ The concern with keeping some degree of equality and social justice is reflected, among other things, in the insistence on restricting land property to what a family could cultivate with its own labor (the so-called “property of use”). In general, peasant leaders in Eastern Europe shared the belief that the road ahead for their countries was that of agrarian development. Most of them admitted some form of industrial development and did not put the matter in either/or form, but they still thought of agrarian development as the more promising line. More often than not this was not due to sentimental attachment to the land, but because they thought it was too late to change the already formed international division of labor.⁵⁹

Agrarianism has been accused by its political adversaries of trying to preserve a backward and inefficient agriculture. In fact, it wasn't looking backward to a mythical peasant golden age. On the contrary, it was concerned with modernizing agriculture by means of technology and agricultural knowledge, by cooperative organization (a very different one from the *sovkhos* type), appropriate credit instruments (cheap agrarian credit), rural education, etc. These policies had to be implemented by the state, governed by peasant parties. The agrarian leaders saw the shortcoming of small-scale production but believed that they could be offset by the cooperative movement and that peasant solidarity could be enhanced by the self-government of the peasant community. Their view of cooperativism actually went much further than a purely economic (technical, financial, commercial) arrangement; it was seen as a peculiar social and cultural institution, a sort of cooperative society, different from both liberal capitalism and collective socialism.⁶⁰ Some agrarianists like the Rumanian Virgil Madgearu even believed for a time that by means of a strong cooperative movement the family-style agricultural economy could escape the capitalist system.⁶¹

In spite of the emphasis on agricultural development and a certain anti-urban bent, it won't be correct to assume that agrarian-

ism was inimical to industrialization. Rather, it was against privileges for industry (and the promotion of “artificial” industries) and in favor of the development of industries firmly based in indigenous agricultural production. The words of Virgil Madgearu, the economist of the Rumanian peasant party and an ideologue of Taranism – peasantism (from *taran* – peasant) – may serve as an illustration: “If peasantism does not have an inherent tendency against industrial development, it is, on the other hand, against tariff protectionism, the breeder of hot-house industries, trusts and cartels.”⁶² Agrarianism was opposed to the cheating of the peasants by wholesale merchants. It was against excessive taxation of the peasants by the state and placing the burden exclusively upon them. In the programs of the agrarian leaders, the financing of rural development and rural welfare was to come (as John Bell notes apropos of Bulgarian agrarianism) from curtailing aggressive foreign policy and military spending.⁶³

The peasant movement acquired an unprecedented momentum on the Balkans after World War First and rose to power on the leftist wave; after some years of office the agrarian governments were brought down whether by coup d’état or by electoral cheating. The Balkan countries succumbed to dictatorships one after the other, especially in the late thirties. While the rule of the peasant parties was unfortunate and disappointing in many respects, the impact of peasantism was not confined to it. The agrarians were the staunchest supporters of the land reforms. These (Bulgaria – 1920, Rumania – 1918-21, Yugoslavia – after 1918) were social measures in the first instance: they broke the larger estates and increased the number of smallholdings.⁶⁴ From a purely economic point of view they were dubious: they meant “not the rise of capitalist farming but the triumphant emergence of the peasants.”⁶⁵ The cooperative movement was also inspired and supported by the peasantist movement. Another important influence of agrarianism on the Balkans was in the political field. The agrarian parties appealed to, and mobilized the peasant majority of the Balkan populations, bringing it into the political arena. This inaugurated the advent of mass democracy in the Balkans, what Huntington calls a “Green uprising,” leading to a deep transformation of the political system.⁶⁶ In their mobilization efforts the agrarians widely used populist demagoguery; some agrarian leaders (Alexander Stamboliiski) were experimenting with bypassing the

state authorities through the party organization while personally dominating the party apparatus.⁶⁷

Agrarianism presents a good opportunity to reconsider the options of modernization on the Balkans. In spite of ideas to restrict the size of the agrarian property and to strengthen the rural community, the agrarianists certainly weren't retrograde, conservative or backward-looking. One can perhaps define them (with Richard Crampton) as "reluctant modernizers," taking cognizance of their emphasis on solidarity and social justice even if economic efficiency was to suffer.⁶⁸ But to dismiss them as "conservative" or obstructionist forces would imply considering industrialization (at the expense of agriculture) as the only possibility for modernization in the Balkans. This is, however, very controversial. Agrarianism was perhaps not so non-viable a strategy at the time. It can be viewed as an alternative strategy of modernization, alternative not to industrialization as such but to an inadequate industrialization (i.e., not based on the country's resources) and – what is more important – alternative to military (and bureaucratic) squandering.⁶⁹ In effect, the failure of the Balkan countries to modernize their agriculture has been widely recognized as a major factor for the blockade of their further development; thus Sundhaussen speaks about the "forgone agrarian revolution."⁷⁰ The agrarian road – of progressive, intensive agriculture – is vindicated by contemporary development theory. As the European experience demonstrates, agricultural modernization preceded industrialism and was in fact the key factor for successful development; this may have been even more so for some small countries in the once-periphery than in the bigger European states.⁷¹

It would be unjust to say that agrarianism failed, because (unlike the Soviet model of state socialism) it was never really tried. As Richard Crampton justly notes: "Agrarianism is perhaps one of the most important and certainly one of the most neglected casualties of the second world war."⁷² By making here the case for agrarianist ideas, I am not asserting that modernization on the Balkans would have succeeded if these were implemented; it is hard to believe that Balkan countries would have had more than qualified successes anyway, because of a number of circumstances, of which perhaps the most decisive were of international nature (including international trade) rather than domestic ones.⁷³ Besides, given the strong divide between town and countryside, it is not at all certain that the agrarian ideas could be effectively implemented by agrarian parties and

movements; agrarian policies would have provoked much less resistance if they were pursued by the traditional urban parties.

Agrarianism is interesting in another respect as well. We have here a case of original, home-grown ideology, firmly footed in the smallholder peasant world of the Balkans; the fit between ideology and reality was almost perfect. This gave agrarianism a pragmatic, down-to-earth outlook. But exactly the fact that it was based so closely to the smallholder peasant realities (and the stubborn insistence on small-scale property) imparted agrarianism with some "conservative" traits in the eyes of its more radical adversaries. Contemporary conditions (of small-scale individual agriculture) were as if projected into the future and built into its image. In this agrarianism was the very opposite of socialism, which was bound to appear "utopian" at the time. This raises the question about how inspiring a modernizing project grounded in the present realities might be. Not that there is a general answer to this but the question implies the need of a longer-term vision as well. The major reason why agrarianism was dismissed as inadequate by many people at the time, however, was the fascination of Balkan leaderships with industrialism, which obstructed other solutions from view.

I now turn to the consideration of negative and defensive responses to modernity (in the shape it took on the Balkans) and to change in general. Just as modernization (progress, development) was equated with the West and Europe in particular, the reaction was bound to assume an anti-Western (anti-European) trait. This, together with the correlative emphasis on the indigenous serve as common denominators of intellectual currents of various inspirations: romantic, populist, Slavophile, orthodox, mystic, organic nationalist, fascist. These shared in the condemnation of such modern phenomena as urban life, commercialization, state bureaucracy, etc., identified with capitalism. Their criticism of the West often borrowed notions and arguments from the West itself: the romantic idea of "organic" development and Herder's notion of national "spirit" (*Geist* or genius), Ferdinand Toennies's famous dichotomy *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, Spengler's opposition between "culture" and "civilization" and the "morphological" approach, his prophecy for a decline of the Western civilization, and there was also interest in racism (de Gobineau). Most of these ideas had only literary existence and were confined to intellectual circles but at times they could become a more general mood.

Populism in the Balkans was strongly influenced by the Russian *narodnichestvo*: a sort of peasantist credo of the Russian intellectuals which produced a movement of “going to the people” (and eventually the formation of the “Land and Liberty” party). The *narodniks* extolled the virtues of the peasants and the worth of the communal institutions: the *mir* or *obshtina* (i.e., the village community) and the *artel* – a community of small producers. They opposed the presumable simplicity, equality, social justice and solidarity of life in these institutions to the miseries and evils wrought by capitalist industrialization and urbanization. They believed that Russia could avoid the path of industrial capitalism with all concomitant evils and progress to a sort of agrarian socialism.⁷⁴ In the famous and long-drawn debate with the “Westerners,” the *narodniks* sided with the Slavophiles, who extolled the peculiarity of the Russian way (as a special mission) and whose mystic veneration of the peasant community had moral-religious and ethnic grounds.⁷⁵ (Later-day populists admitted the possibility of industrialization but continued to assert that agriculture could and should avoid capitalism.)

Populism found a very fertile soil in the Balkans because of certain similarity of conditions: a majority of peasants (though only in Rumania held in semi-servitude), a challenge from Western industrialism, etc. Just like the Russian *narodniki* relied on the *mir* to evade the evils of capitalism, some of the Balkan populists turned their hopes to the extended family community (the South-Slav *zadruga*). That the Balkans where agrarian conditions prevailed were a fertile ground for populism, which found here indigenous sources and inspirations is demonstrated by the fact that it crossed the borders of Rumania: a non-Slav country without a tradition of peasant self-management. The well-known Rumanian populist Constantin Stere propagated the populist (Poporanist) doctrine through his journal *Viata Romaneasca*; he denied the possibility of industrialization of Rumania, reasoning that it was too late for successful competition with the already advanced states.⁷⁶ In his view Rumania presents a cultural and historic entity with a national genius of its own and an inherent tendency of development. He believed that in an overwhelmingly peasant state like Rumania development should proceed on peasantist foundations (prosperous small peasantry and cooperatives) and that political progress should necessarily lead to rural democracy. Searching for the authentic sources of Rumanian

culture, Stere turned to the peasantry; according to him it was the only "positive class" in Rumania that had preserved the Rumanian soul in a pure form.

Populist and romantic writings, especially works of fiction, contained idealizations of peasant life (in opposition to the city) and of the relations in the extended family, an admiration for the traditional virtues, opposed to what was seen as brought about by the new times – crass individualism and egoism, greed for money and its dehumanizing influence, etc. Populist ideas found expression in sociological essayism: e.g., in the writings of the Poporanist group in Rumania, in some works of Ante Radic in Croatia, in essays on the national mentality and culture in Bulgaria, etc.⁷⁷ Congenial in spirit though more diffuse were poetic condemnations of the city, of capitalism and bureaucracy, and even of the state. Thus Serb romantic writers and poets dreamt of a regeneration of the patriarchal institutions: a new "phoenix world" of the *zadruga*. Laza Kostic admonished his Serb compatriots not to seek salvation in the West, "where the shopkeeper and the broker rule"; Milovan Glishic targeted the city with its restless crowds and foul marketplace (*charshiia*) in his attacks; Djura Jakshic and Stevan Sremac warned against the dangers of Europeanization.⁷⁸ The anti-urban fad and the craving for the purity of peasant life spread among Bulgarian turn-of-the-century poets as well.⁷⁹ The irony is that the anti-urban and anti-capitalist poetry was most often written by people who had actually lived only in small towns and had little experience with advanced capitalism and urbanization. Though this sometimes sounds as anticipation of things yet to come, "capitalism," "bureaucracy" and "the foreign" have their local referents and grievances, reminding that it is the underdevelopment of capitalism from which people suffer more, rather than advanced capitalism.

There was also populism of a more civic vein, inspired by the (pre-liberation) ideal of "closeness to the people" of the Balkan intelligentsia, notably in Serbia and Bulgaria. This civic ideal and the associated notion of social indebtedness of the educated elites had nothing to do with the attitude of the Russian gentry, conscience-stricken after century-long estrangement from the common people; rather, it meant that they were demanded to subordinate their own interests to the national goal of liberation of "the people."⁸⁰ A later generation of *narodnik* writers in this civic vein elaborated the idea of the public role of the intelligentsia and spelled out particular tasks

for the "common good," such as bringing knowledge and enlightenment to the common people, instructing them in the civic virtues as well as in such practical issues as the improvement of hygiene, agronomy, etc., all this to be carried out on self-initiative and in non-remunerated service for the community.⁸¹ The poverty and ignorance of the peasants, the decline of patriarchal life, the spread of corruption and careerism among the civil servants, etc., provoked the bitterness and anger of the *narodnik* writers. The young village teacher, acting with apostolic faith and dedication, was a pet positive hero in populist stories and novels, many of which narrate autobiographic experiences. Eventually, like in the unrelenting realities of life, lofty ideals and hopes for improvement of the rural conditions gave way to disappointment and disillusionment.

One may take populism as a point of departure to reflect upon the ideological functions the past and of the "common people" in the course of modernizing change. Characteristically, the idealization of peasant life and of the tradition was most often the work of intellectuals, who, even if they originated in peasant strata, already lead a different way of life; to take this seriously means that one should look more closely into their experiences, in spite of their identification with the "people." What was extolled and venerated by some populists was to a large extent an imaginary and fictitious past, a harmonious "patriarchal epoch" which hardly ever existed (we should recall the fact of foreign domination in the Balkans). The virtues were typically patriarchal and communitarian: collective work, obedience of the younger to the older, mutual help and exchange of services within the village community, the obligation for hospitality, etc., but the negative aspects of that same tradition (e.g., hard toil, the suppression of individual autonomy and initiative) were never mentioned. Or, tradition was at least highly stylized if not altogether invented. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the tradition became an object of veneration in the very moment when it was already in dissolution, while, on the other hand, things had not yet completely changed. The co-presence of two different worlds in the memory (and to an extent in the realities) made "idealization" possible, especially when the old times, now harmless and passing away, were set against a disappointing present. The idealization of the past and of the unadulterated peasant (or "the people") cannot be separated from contemporary realities; in fact, it could serve as an escape, or, more actively, as a vantage point from which to exercise

critique upon an unattractive present and to voice apprehensions about the future.⁸² That the reaction to modernity should take the form of nostalgia is hardly surprising. After all, modernity did not present itself in so nice an attire to the majority of the population of the small Balkan states, as to elicit unqualified admiration.

Among the defensive reactions to modernizing change, special mention should be made of the search for support and inspiration in a unique ethnic and cultural identity and in a singular path of the nation in history. One can label these attempts “**autochtonism**” (or “organic nationalism”). The Balkan nations were lucky to have more “usable past” (the expression stems from Daniel Lerner) in comparison to some African “nations,” as a material for elaborating such identities. Thus the Greeks could symbolically appropriate the Hellenic civilization, the Rumanians traced their origins as back as the Dacians,⁸³ Bulgarians evoked the glories of their medieval kingdom and so did the Serbs. The cultural tradition and the national identity could be constructed as peasant (“folk”-ethnographic), as ethnic, in terms of race, as orthodox, as pagan, etc. There were also intensive attempts to define the traits of the “national character” or the national mentality. Poets, novelists, literary critics, historians, sociologists, psychologists, theologians, etc., exercised their imagination in discovering the spiritual locus of the nation, defining unique national traits or penetrating the national destinies. Some of the finest and most spiritual and inspired but also the most speculative works are found within this tradition.⁸⁴ It was more intellectual and esoteric than all previously mentioned trends.

A very useful account of Rumanian “autochtonism” (or “traditionalism”) is provided by Keith Hitchins. Rumanian traditionalism originated in Junimism (from *junimea* – youth), the dominant literary doctrine between the 1860s and the 1870s, elaborated by the literary critic Titu Maiorescu.⁸⁵ He stood in defense of a national culture and national institutions in accordance with the “innate” character of the Rumanian people and opposed borrowings from abroad and the “grafting” of European institutions and culture onto Rumania. Similar to the already mentioned Poporanism of Constantin Stere but more nationalistic was the doctrine of Samanatorism (from *samanator* – sower), developed by the imminent historian Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940). He also believed that the authentic national culture had to be sought in the Rumanian rural tradition and attacked cultural imports, the cosmopolitan city and the

“craze” for everything French. His model of Rumania was based on an idealized past: agrarian, patriarchal and free of class conflict. Investigations of the Rumanian uniqueness and of specific national traits proceeded with an added zeal between the wars: the so-called doctrine of Romanismul (Rumanianism), argued by Constantin Radulescu-Motru deserves a special mention. In his view as well, the peasantry and the village presented a bulwark of the nation (conceived as a community: *Gemeinschaft*) against disintegrative capitalist influences. Furthermore, he insisted that Rumania has a specific mission in Europe, rooted in deep ethnic sources. Trairism (from *traire* – experience) of Nae Ionescu was another doctrine – a Rumanian version of existentialism with a mystical and nihilist bent. Perhaps most celebrated and influential of the Rumanian traditional currents between the wars was the circle around the literary review *Gindirea* (“Thought”). Though it gave access to various authors and ideas and passed through several phases, pivotal was the “literary Orthodoxism” or “Gindirism” of the editor-in-chief Nichifor Crainic. He proclaimed Eastern Orthodoxy and the rural tradition to be the primary ingredients of the Rumanian national character and believed in the profound religiosity of the peasantry. In seeking the key in Orthodox spirituality and the Eastern heritage, as opposed to the presumably spiritless Western bourgeois world, this trend differed from the above-mentioned doctrines, all of which emphasized the goal of national regeneration.

Some Bulgarian examples: there emerged in literary criticism and sociological essayism between the wars something that may be called “Bulgarianism” – a doctrine of the Bulgarian uniqueness, resting on nationalist (sometimes Slav racial) premises.⁸⁶ Again, as in the Rumanian examples, an idealized glorious mediaeval past or an imaginary paganness (less often Eastern orthodoxy) were the objects of self-glorification. Ianko Ianev, an author with a fascist bent, wrote that although the Bulgarians owe a great deal to Western culture, it is precisely the Western influence (but also the Russian) that had prevented the Bulgarian spirit “from stepping upon a firm ground and embarking upon its own authentic and self-responsible path.”⁸⁷ Europe is, in his view, a decadent civilization that has nothing positive to offer. In an ultra-nationalistic spirit the same author dreamed of rejuvenation of the Bulgarian spirit that should proceed, according to him, from “the innermost peculiarity of the tribe, its cosmic pre-motherhood, which differs from both Slav mysticism and

from the intellectualistic mechanicity of the Western man.”⁸⁸ The Bulgarian spirit was further defined as pagan, and the Bulgarian nation itself as primordial and virgin. In a similar high-pitched metaphorical style another author – Naiden Sheitanov – exalted the authentic “folk culture,” defined again as pagan, going back to the pre-Christian epoch and the mediaeval heresies.⁸⁹ In phantasmagoric visions of this kind, the advance of the nation was sometimes linked to a pan-Slav take-off, whereby the Slavs were praised for their presumed immediacy to life, a sense of the mystic and the sacred, etc., and contrasted with European rationality, formalism, technicality and bureaucracy;⁹⁰ or they were accorded a mediating role between the East and Europe.⁹¹ I am deliberately selecting extreme examples; there exist much finer efforts to distill the national peculiarity from folk songs and melodies, and from language itself.

In describing the Bulgarian national identity many searched for peculiar national “traits” (character, mentality, psychology, etc.). I explored this topic at more length elsewhere.⁹² Underlying all such attempts was the assumption of a more or less constant national character made up of a set of traits and derived from a highly idealized and in fact atemporal “traditional epoch.” Many authors are in agreement that the authentic character was corrupted afterwards by the individualism and egoism of the modern (bourgeois) times. While some of these constructions are self-glorifying, most of them are pessimist and serve self-critical purposes, reflecting bitter personal experiences. Even in the visual arts (and partly in poetry) there developed a movement for an “indigenous” art (partly inspired by the German *Heimatskunst*) which proclaimed a “return” to the local tradition as its goal and rejected in theory the foreign influences. In fact, as convincingly demonstrated by art historians, it presupposed a highly individualized, hence modern mentality of the artist; it rejected naturalistic imitation in the depiction of the “native” and made use of modern (expressionist) techniques in achieving a distinctive “decorativist style.”⁹³ End of examples.

There are a number of ways in which the various attempts in constructing the national identity and the unique national way can be interpreted as a reaction to modernizing change. To begin with, they all satisfy a longing for something hard and durable *vis-à-vis* change: whether a timeless essence, unchangeable feature or historical continuity (“tradition”). It is not accidental that they often single out the peasant, i.e., the most traditional and immutable social class,

as an ideal. Some of these constructions are understandable only as a response to an overwhelming outside challenge: the one posed by Western superiority. They attempt the *tour-de-force* of restoring one's pride and dignity by strongly asserting the native against the foreign, even if, and especially if, the foreign influence is very strong and pervasive. The compensativity of such constructions manifests itself in the very vigor (and the excesses) of the nationalist self-assertion. The "justification" of the nation can assume different forms: an affirmation of the worth of the native culture, of the virtues of the national character, emphasis on the uniqueness of the national path of development (sometimes with a cling of *missionarism*), etc. In dealing with the challenge of the modern West many developing countries acknowledge its technological and economic superiority, while rejecting Western forms of government, social organization and everyday life.⁹⁴ The native equality or even superiority can then be affirmed in everything except technology and economy, ignoring the complex interdependencies between the various spheres. More subtle intellectual self-defense operates through a series of evaluative oppositions, where the autochthonous has a positive sign. Thus the native is opposed to the West as the organic to the artificial, the profound (inner essences) to the superficial (forms and outer appearances), as human emotion to cool calculating reason, as the (supportive) small community to (individualistic and egoist) society, as spirituality to mechanicity, or, in the opposite version, "naturalness" to artificiality. The final station in the retreat into the depth of the spiritual values, where one has presumable advantages over the rationality of the West, is perhaps mysticism.

In fulfilling the above-mentioned functions the (ethnic, religious, racial, etc.) identities are very selective and strongly distort the native past and culture, to the point of presenting total fabrications. Self-justification easily turns into self-glorification and self-celebration. While the attitude towards one's own identity, community and tradition is indulgent to the point of *naïveté*, the attitude towards the West (or what stands for it in the native conditions) is highly critical. Warranted critiques against the West are mixed with very strained or completely false ones.⁹⁵ The typical calls for regeneration of the nation (or the faith), for a return to one's roots, for rediscovering and regaining one's authenticity, for a revival and taking up the route from which the nation has presum-

ably deviated and the like, often have political objectives or political uses, so that one may speak about a politics of identity.⁹⁶ While they may serve purposes of societal integration on a higher level (and the overcoming of parochial loyalties) they may also be conducive to extreme nationalism, fundamentalism, xenophobia, etc. And the problem remains that even when rejecting the values and standards of the metropolitan society, people in the periphery actually still use them as standards of evaluation and a framework of perception.⁹⁷ Fixed to the West in their very negativity, the much-praised alternative ways prove a deadlock.

Among the reactions to modernizing change one should mention the ideas of the extreme Right shading into **fascism**. I will not go here into the well-known dispute of its relationship to modernity: whether it was a continuation and carrying to a logical extreme of modernity itself, or a counter-reaction and an aberration of the Enlightenment project of modernity. Whatever the conclusion, there is little doubt that fascism used the technological advance of the modern epoch to its sinister ends, and it received its popular support at least partly by capitalizing on the malcontents of wide strata with the consequences of modernization; a well-known thesis about the rise of Nazism centers upon the contradictions between technological advance and a still traditional social basis. I will consider here only some Balkan parallels to fascism and then only briefly.

One should distinguish between "purer" fascist formations on the Balkans such as Cuza's League of National Christian Defense and especially Codreanu's "Iron Guard" in Rumania, Tzankov's Popular Social Movement in Bulgaria,⁹⁸ the Liotic's party "Zbor" with mainly Serb supporters and the Ustashi in Croatia,⁹⁹ and an element of fascism in other political formations or governments. While some of the Balkan governments have been called fascist or royal-fascist: of Marshal Antonescu and King Karol in Rumania, Alexander Tzankov's coup d'état in 1923 and Tzar Boris's regime of the late thirties in Bulgaria, Milan Stojadinovic's cabinet in Yugoslavia (1935-1938), they were actually hardly more than military and royal dictatorships. As David Mitrany aptly characterized them: "The eastern dictatorships were never anything but bureaucratic and military regimes, as brittle as they were inefficient and oppressive."¹⁰⁰

The strongest fascist movement on the Balkans was Codreanu's "Iron Guard" in Rumania.¹⁰¹ It was anti-Semitic, anti-communist and chauvinist, anti-industrialist and anti-capitalist. The Guardists

attacked bourgeois society and exalted the unspoiled soul of the peasant, not without similarity with literary Populism and cultural nationalism. Characteristic of the movement, as of fascism in general, was the appeal to the organic, the primitive, the instinctive and irrational – the so-called “mythical,” and the rejection of the logical and the rational in human experience and social life. The Guardists elaborated a cult of the primitive – not of a long by-gone traditional epoch but of contemporary peasant life in Rumania. They appealed to the people (i.e., the peasants) and mobilized traditional sentiments and attachments (to the soil, home, the community, etc.), developing into a populist movement. Codreanu did not have a political program, in fact, he emphatically rejected programs and insisted that “new men” were more necessary, who would regenerate society and put an end to the present corruption. In the training of the new man, the organization required unconditional loyalty and subordination of the individual to the unit (called a “nest”) and developed a cult of heroism and death. An original trait of the Iron Guard in its formative period was its Christian religiosity and asceticism, not unlike a revivalist religious movement.¹⁰² While the ideology contained some “spiritual” and idealistic elements, actual behavior in power was very different. During the brief period from September 1940 to January 1941 when the Iron Guard shared power with general Ion Antonescu, indeed, under a different leader – Horia Sima – it engaged in killings, pillage and extortion.

As for the relation to modernization, which is of central interest here, one can see in fascism an entirely negative (and irrational) response to the unsolved problems in the political body, as did Henry Roberts regarding Rumanian fascism (in this case the problems being the agrarian question, the strains of industrialism, etc.).¹⁰³ The fascination of fascist (and rightist) ideologues with visions of the pre-modern times sometimes as far back as paganism, the cultivation of a sort of romantic heroism, the mystification of the national “spirit” and the dreams about regeneration of the nation from present corruption and debilitation, all attest to a negative (and sometimes backward-looking) response to the challenges of development. It is not accidental that Rumanian fascism attracted “social misfits, unemployed intellectuals, dismissed civil servants, a number of the members of the old boyar families, plus an assortment of plain toughs and hooligans.”¹⁰⁴ But apart from socially marginal people, fascism in Eastern Europe drew its support primarily from teachers,

the bureaucracy, the clergy, and the army (reservists and veterans but also the regular army).¹⁰⁵

The relationship of the pro-fascist Balkan movements and governments to modernity was more complex. Fascism presented itself as the political solution to "false" parliamentary democracy. In the Balkans in particular, false constitutionalism and the constant bickering of the traditional parties for the spoils of office contributed to the discrediting of parliamentary democracy and the attraction to stronger and more personal forms of government, which would presumably restore order, enhance efficiency and regenerate the society. On a more abstract plane, fascism (and the Right in general) just like nationalism opposed an organic and collectivist concept of society to the individualistic one of liberal democracy.¹⁰⁶ The attraction of the corporatism, whose leading exponent in the Balkans was the Rumanian economist Mihail Manoilescu, is a sign of the same trend.¹⁰⁷ The corporatist doctrine envisioned (centrally managed) cooperation between professional groups, economic branches, etc., and the orientation of the economy to "social" purposes, even if that meant violation of sacred principles of liberalism and doing harm to private interests. All this amounts to another project of coping with the impasses of modernization, which puts the stake on "organic" national unity and social cooperation (the suppression of class warfare) to be achieved through subordination to leaders and, eventually, a strong state authority. At the time this seemed to be the only (radical enough) alternative to socialism, with which it shared a collectivistic concept and ethos (and even a kind of state socialist idea) but was divided by its nationalism and insistence upon class cooperation. During the time of the Great Depression, so ruinous to the middle classes in the West, fascism even gained advantage over socialism with its class divisiveness and call for workers' internationalism.¹⁰⁸ The fact that where fascists attained power their "solution" to the problems and tensions of society degenerated in an unheard of brutality and that all elements of the doctrine: organicism, the cult for the leader, elitism of the followers, discipline and heroism, etc., developed their pernicious potential, should not make us forget the fact that it looked viable at the time, moreover, it was dynamic and forward-looking and claimed the future for itself.

The possibility that pro-fascist movements outside Germany and Italy and even outside Europe were looking at the Nazis and the Fascists as “merely dynamic, efficient, non-socialist, authoritarian modernizers” has been suggested by Henry Turner.¹⁰⁹ I think that some of the Balkan putative fascisms and governments of the “strong hand” lend a plausibility to this thesis. The times (and especially the Central European examples) seemed to “point to” rightist authoritarian solutions: debasement of the parliamentary institution and dissolution of the political parties, recourse to violent means in “restoring order” and “achieving progress.” The special appeal of such solutions (not only to social marginals) in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe in the 1930s derived from the malfunctioning of liberal democracy (the drastic abuses of power) and from the economic failures.¹¹⁰ But the weakness of fascism in the region was due to that same political corruption and economic inefficiency. Considering Balkan fascism, some “reservations” are in place; perhaps its most characteristic trait was not racism but ultranationalism: it was more concerned with the elevation of the national prestige than with the establishment of a new world order – an incommensurate task for a small Balkan state anyway.¹¹¹

To **conclude**, the challenge of the West produced several major ideas about development on the Balkans, displayed in ideologies and in more restricted intellectual currents. All began with unqualified admiration for the West and the optimistic belief that once an independent nation-state is created, it would accelerate the development and bridge the gap with the more advanced. The borrowing of Western institutions (modern state apparatus, liberal democracy, etc.) and the efforts of industrialization seemed to guarantee success along that road. The belief in “progress” is reflected in the otherwise very diverse projects of nationalism, liberalism, and socialism. As a reaction against the growing cleavage between town and village and the exploitation of the peasants, an alternative (indigenous) view on development came into existence. Agrarianists expected progress to come from the village and the development of small individual agriculture. With growing disappointment from the “native” achievements and the fading of the aura of the West, skeptical voices about the route followed, which, in fact, were there all along, became louder. The “conservative” reaction (the word is not meant as evaluation) found expression in various forms: looking for support and reassurance in the past and to

the (mostly peasant) "people," attempts to define the authentic national identity and the affirmation of a unique path, etc. At the same time, the radical projects of transformation of communism and fascism were elaborated.¹¹² After communism, the problem of under-development is still with (most of) the Balkan states and the gap separating them from the advanced West looms larger than before. Disputes about the course of development: the fate of agriculture, of the existing industries, new markets, foreign capital, etc., resumed, and so did socio-political struggles and ideological justifications; what solutions will be elaborated remains to be seen.

NOTES

1. The paper was prepared at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, of which I had the privilege to be a member during the academic year 1995-96. I had the opportunity to present my ideas to the participants in the Modernization Seminar of the School of Social Science, from whose pertinent remarks I benefited a lot. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Andrew W. Mellon Foundation for its support.

2. L. Stavrianos, "The Influence of the West on the Balkans," in Charles and Barbara Jelavich (eds.), *The Balkans in Transition* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1974), 192-196.

3. Peter Sugar, "The Enlightenment on the Balkans. Some Considerations," in *East European Quarterly*, IX, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 499-507.

4. To cite as an example the words of a well-known Bulgarian national activist: "We are lagging behind, so much behind that there is hardly another European nation behind us on this path, except for the Albanians who are even more unfortunate in this respect – Petko R. Slaveikov, "Za obrazovanieto na naroda," in *Makedonia*, II, no. 14, March 2, 1868; no. 15, March 9, 1868 (reprinted in: Petko R. Slaveikov, *Suchineniia v 8 toma*, vol. 6 (Sofia, 1980): 100.

5. About the Bulgarian case, see my essay, Roumen Daskalov, "Images' of Europe: a Glance from the Periphery," in *Working Papers SPS*, no. 94/8 (Florence: European University Institute), 1994.

6. As Reinhard Bendix noted, nationalism in the developing countries was so powerful during the nineteenth century because it was coupled with the longing of the common people for human dignity and civic respectability and an acute awareness of the development in the advanced countries; when this quest was later frustrated, people turned to the socialist alternative – see Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 9:3 (1967): 340.

7. This genuine "revolution in the vogues" was ironically depicted by contemporaries like Dobri Voinikov, "Predgovor," in Dobri Voinikov, *Krivorazbranova tsivilizatsia* (Bucharest, 1871), p. I; see also Nikola Mikhailovski, article in *Tsarigradski vestnik*, no. 313, 1857. A good description of the various expressions of the "alla franga" vogue is provided by Nikolai Genchev, *Frantsia v bulgarskoto dukhovno vuzrazhdane* (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo, 1989), 384-412; Nikolai Genchev,

Bulgarskata kultura XV-XIX v. (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo, 1988), 256, 271-273.

8. Petko R. Slaveikov, "Dneshnoto sustoianie," in *Chitalishte*, 3, 1 (1872): 31-32 (reprinted in: Petko R. Slaveikov, *Suchineniia*, vol. 7, Sofia, 1981, 330-332). Analogous warnings were made by D. Voinikov, who pointed to some more advanced neighboring peoples as negative examples – Dobri Voinikov, "Predgovor," p. II.

9. "Othering" may result from conquest or it may be a means to maintain social or ideological distance. But a deeply rooted psychological need of constituting one's identity would produce "Others" even where such circumstances are absent. About this see Richard Johnson, "Towards a Cultural Theory of the Nation: A British-Dutch Dialogue," in A. Galema, B. Henkes and H. te Vede (eds.), *Different Meanings of Dutchness 1870-1940* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), 199-204.

10. See Raymond Crew, "The Construction of National Identity," in Peter Boerner, (ed.), *Concepts of National Identity* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986), 37-38.

11. "Dluzhnosta i grazhdaninut," in *Chitalishte*, 3:3 (1872): 335-336.

12. Dobri Voinikov, "Predgovor," I-II. The play itself is somewhat superficial – it ridicules the wearing of fashion clothes, paying mundane compliments to women, the use of French words and phrases in the conversations, modern dances, etc. as wrong understanding of the European civilization.

13. Liuben Karavelov, "Otivat pateta, a se vrushtat guski," in *Nezavisimost*, 4, no. 13, 12 January 1874, reprinted in: Liuben Karavelov, *Subrani Suchineniia*, vol. 5 (Sofia, 1985). Slaveikov's poem "Konteto" and his comedy "Malakov" as well as R. Zhinzifov's poem "Na Inozemetsa" were written with the same satirical intention.

14. Andrew Janos, "The Politics of Backwardness in Continental Europe, 1780-1945," in *World Politics*, 41:3 (1989): 325-358, esp. 327- 329, 331-334.

15. Dobri Voinikov, "Predgovor," p. I; also Petko Slaveikov, "De sme i kak sme?," in *Gaida*, 3, 7 (April 1, 1866), reprinted in: Petko Slaveikov, *Suchineniia v 8 toma*, vol. 5 (Sofia, 1980): 229.

16. Bulgarian examples are Ivan Hadzhiiski, "Optimistichna teoriia za nashia narod," in Ivan Hadzhiiski, *Suchineniia v dva toma*, vol. 1; Konstantin Gulubov, *Ornamenti (Filosofski i literaturni eseta)* (Sofia, 1934) [included in: Mincho Draganov (ed.), *Narodopsikhologiiia na bulgarite. Antologiiia* (Sofia, 1984), 567-569.]

17. About phases of modernization, see Cyril Black, "Russia and Modernization on the Balkans," in Charles and Barbara Jelavich (eds.), *The Balkans in Transition* (Hemden, CT: Archon, 1974), 146-147. In another context Cyril Black distinguished three main types of modernizing ideologies: liberal, Marxist-Leninist and national-statist – Cyril Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization. A Study in Comparative History* (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row, 1966), 136.

18. Alexander Gerschenkron was inclined to think that the more backward the country, the greater was going to be the role of the state in fostering industrial development (and in substituting for lacking prerequisites). See Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), 16-21, 48-49, 353-359. About modernization policies of Balkan states, see for example John Lampe and Marvin Jackson, *Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); John Lampe, "Belated Balkan Modernization and the Consequences of Communist Power, 1918-1948," in Roland Schoenfeld (ed.), *Industrialisierung und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Suedosteuroopa* (München: Suedosteuroopa-Gesellschaft, 1989), 21-44; Alan Milward and S. Saul, *The Development of the Economies of Continental Europe 1850-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), 427-465; John Allcock, "Aspects of the Development of Capitalism in Yugoslavia. The Role of the State in the Formation of a "Satellite" Economy," in Francis Carter (ed.), *An*

Historical Geography of the Balkans (London–New York–San Francisco: Academic Press, 1977), 535-580; Nicolas Spulber, "The Role of the State in Economic Growth in Eastern Europe since 1860," in Hugh Aitken (ed.), *The State and Economic Growth* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1959), 255-286; Henry Roberts, *Rumania. Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), 89-130.

19. Nicolas Spulber, "Changes in the Economic Structures on the Balkans," in Charles and Barbara Jelavich (eds.), *The Balkans in Transition*, 353; John Allcock, "Aspects of the Development," 573; Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 110.

20. See for example Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), 138-150. On the problem of the excessive growth of the state personnel in late modernizers (with examples from Greece and some Latin American countries), see Nicos Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1986), 11-12.

21. Nicolas Spulber, "The Role of the State"; see also Dragoljub Yovanovich, "Les classes moyennes chez les slaves du sud," in C. Bougle (ed.), *Inventaires III (Classes Moyennes)* (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1939), 237-238. The major role of the Yugoslav state in the development of the capitalist economy (in banking and credit, the military build-up, direct participation in productive enterprises, etc.) is treated by John Allcock, "Aspects of the Development," 562-573.

22. See the argument of Konrad and Szelenyi that in the absence of strong bourgeois classes in Eastern Europe, the carrying out of a program of "capitalist transformation" (and a "democratic revolution") proved to be a very dubious and almost impossible enterprise; it usually resulted in the strengthening of the state bureaucracy – Georg Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), 10-11, 109-135. About the turning of the new nation-states of the European periphery into an instrument of revenue raising and income transfer from the society at large to the state officials, see Andrew Janos, "The Politics of Backwardness in Continental Europe," 337-347; Andrew Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825-1945* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), 313-314, 322.

23. See Cyril Black, "Russia and Modernization on the Balkans," 146-147.

24. See Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press), 324-325; John Allcock, "Aspects of the Development," 567-568. About the high costs of the revisionist foreign policy for Bulgaria, see Cyril Black, "The Process of Modernization: The Bulgarian Case," in Thomas Butler (ed.), *Bulgaria. Past and Present* (Columbus, Ohio: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1976), 117-118, 127; John Bell, "Modernization through Secularization in Bulgaria," in Gerasimos Augustinos (ed.), *Diverse Paths to Modernity in South-eastern Europe* (New York–Westport–London: Greenwood Press, 1991), 21-22.

25. In another context, apropos of native fascism, Eugen Weber notes the "seeming but not uncommon paradox of nationalists serving the ends of alien nations" – see Eugen Weber, "Romania," in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds.), *The European Right* (Berkeley: The University of California Press), 554.

26. About the impact of great powers on the international politics of a small state, see the perceptive paper of Henry Roberts, "Politics in a Small State: The Balkan Example," in Charles and Barbara Jelavich (eds.), *The Balkans in Transition*, 376-395.

27. About the debates and the new artistic experiences and vogues among Bulgarian poets and painters at the turn of the century, see Dimitur Avramov, "Stil-dekorativizum-natsionalen dukh," in Dimitur Avramov, *Dialog mezhdu dve izkustva* (Sofia: Bulgarski Pisatel, 1993), 17-79; Dimitur Avramov, "Dvizhenieto 'rodno

izkustvo' – estetika i perspektivi," in Dimitur Avramov, *Dialog mezhdu dve izkustva*, 205-245. For similar debates, which divided the intelligentsia in Rumania between the wars, see Keith Hitchins, *Rumania 1866-1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 292-334.

28. One may point to such examples of cultural Europeanism as the "circle" of intellectuals around the Bulgarian literary journal "Misul" ("Thought") at the turn of the century, Bulgarian symbolist and expressionist poets; Rumanian examples are provided by the editors of the Rumanian review *Viata Romaneasca* ("Rumanian life") and the circle gathered around the literary review *Sburatorul* ("The Winged Spirit"), especially his editor Eugen Lovinescu, the Rumanian sociologist Stefan Zeletin, etc. See Keith Hitchins, "Gindirea: Nationalism in a Spiritual Guise," in Kenneth Jowitt (ed.), *Social Change in Romania 1860-1940* (Berkeley: University of California, 1978), 140-142. About the ideas of Zeletin, see Daniel Chirot, "Neoliberal and Social-Democratic Theories of Development: The Zeletin-Voinea Debate concerning Romania's Prospects in the 1920s and its Contemporary Importance," in Kenneth Jowitt (ed.), *Social Change in Romania*, 31-52. About the impact of the French Revolution on the Danubian Principalities and early Rumanian "Westerners," see John Campbell, "The Influence of Western Political Thought in the Rumanian Principalities, 1821-1848: The Generation of 1848," in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 4:3 (1944): 262-273.

29. About the contemporary posing of this problem in Bulgaria, see Nikola Agunski, "Trite pokoleniia," in *Arkhiv za stopanska i sotsialna politika*, 19:4 (1937): 236-244, esp. 242-243. Konstantin Petkanov, "Bulgarskata inteligentsia kato rozhbba i otritsanie na bulgarskoto selo," in *Filosofski pregled*, 4:2 (1932): 124-135; Atanas Iliev, "Problemata za psikhologiiata na svremennite bulgari," in *Prosveta*, 5:7 (1940): 769-781, esp. 772 ff. The estrangement or "alienation" of the educated strata from the more traditional segments of the society is a very common problem for developing societies. See H. Mancilla, *Die Trugbilder der Entwicklung in der Dritten Welt* (München-Wien-Zürich: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 1986), 153-155.

30. This was the position of contemporary Bulgarian intellectuals as Atanas Iliev, "Narodnostno obosobiavane na bulgarskata kultura," in *Bulgarska misul*, 11:1 (1936): 3-6; Atanas Iliev, "Narodnost i kultura," in *Bulgarska misul*, 10, 7-8 (1935): 453; Konstantin Petkanov, "Bulgarskata kultura i chuzhdentsite," in *Izkustvo i kritika*, 1938, no. 4: 183. Curiously, the above-mentioned attempts at mediation still stand on a nationalist ground. A more neutral opinion would perhaps imply admitting that "the native" (or national) may be represented by modern techniques or that "universal" achievements, too, grow on national soil, and that, consequently, the most creative national works of art may aspire to an universal status.

31. For an attempt to theorize this sort of cultural anomie, see Maria Mies, "Kulturautonomie als Folge der westlichen Bildung dargestellt am Beispiel des indischen Erziehungssystems," in *Die Dritte Welt*, 1:1 (1972): 33; H. Mancilla, *Die Trugbilder der Entwicklung in der Dritten Welt* (München-Wien-Zürich: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 1986), 154-155.

32. Andrew Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary*, 317-318.

33. Victoria Brown, "The Adaptation of a Western Political Theory in a Peripheral State: The Case of Romanian Liberalism," in Stephen Fischer-Galati, Radu Florescu and George Ursul (eds.), *Romania Between East and West. Historical Essays in Memory of Constantin Giurescu* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 276-277, 282-283; Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 109.

34. John Campbell, "The Influence of Western Political Thought," 263.

35. Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 109-110; Victoria Brown, "The Adaptation of a Western Political Theory," 283-284. About the neo-liberalism of Zeletin, see Daniel Chirot, "Neoliberal and Social Democratic Theories," 31-52.

36. Leo Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928); Nicolas Spulber, "Changes in the Economic Structures," 355-356.

37. As Eugen Weber wittily noted, laissez faire et passer acquired a rather different meaning in Rumania – that those who could "faire et passer" made the most of their opportunities and of the people's ignorant helplessness in despoiling and exploiting the peasant – see Eugen Weber, "Romania," 503.

38. Liberalism in Rumania is discussed by Victoria Brown, "The Adaptation of a Western Political Theory," 269-270; Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 108-116. About the debate on liberalism in Bulgaria, see Cyril Black, "The Influence of Western Political Thought in Bulgaria, 1850-1885," in *The American Historical Review*, 48:3 (1943): 507-520, esp. 516-520; Cyril Black, "Russia and the Modernization," 154-156.

39. Victoria Brown demonstrates many common traits between Rumanian liberalism (as professed by the Rumanian National Liberal Party) and a later brand of Western liberalism, which she calls "sectarian liberalism." The latter qualified significantly such principles of classical liberalism as individual freedom, equality of political participation, non-intervention by the government in the economy and self-government for every nationality. See Victoria Brown, "The Adaptation of a Western Political Theory," 278-281.

40. Andrew Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary*, 316-317. Janos notes the irony of the fact that the liberal states in the peripheries were rendered impotent by their most attractive feature – the modicum of public liberties they wanted to grant to their citizens. Operating in a situation of scarcity of means relative to professed goals, they became repressive enough to be discredited as non-democratic, but not repressive enough to break traditional vested interests to the progress of their economies.

41. Andrew Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary*, 65-66.

42. Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 109-110; Victoria Brown, "The Adaptation of a Western Political Theory," 284-286.

43. Cyril Black, "Russia and the Modernization," 157-159.

44. Traian Stoianovich, "The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. I, 1958-1959, 262-272; David Mitrany, *Marx and the Peasant. A Study in Social Dogmatism* (The University of North Carolina Press, 1951), 37-38.

45. Lucien Karchmar, "Communism in Bulgaria, 1918-1921," in Ivo Banac (ed.), *The Effects of World War I: The Class War after the Great War: The Rise of Communist Parties in East Central Europe, 1918-1921* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983), 231-277, esp. 231-235.

46. In fact, socialism had a fertile ground at that time although not where he was looking for it – among the almost non-existent proletariat – but primarily among disgruntled intelligentsia produced in such abundance by the East European societies.

47. Alexander Gerschenkron, "Some Aspects of Industrialization in Bulgaria, 1878-1939," in Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness*, 198-234, esp. 220-223.

48. David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant*, 38.

49. See for example Dimitur Blagoev, *Ikonichnoto razvitie na Bulgaria. Industriia ili zemledelie* (Varna, 1902). This was also the position of the most important Rumanian Marxist theorist C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea (1855-1920) who opposed the populist belief and did not see an alternative to the capitalist industrial path. See Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 276-277.

50. Alexander Gerschenkron, "Some Aspects of Industrialization," 218-219.

51. The fate of the peasants was one of the most tricky questions for the early Russian socialists and a major dividing line between them and the populists. See the

illuminating discussion by David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant*, 35-37. The fate of the peasants was of much greater concern for at least some Balkan Marxists who were more attentive to the particular conditions in a backward country. Thus Dobrogeanu-Gherea believed that under the hybrid conditions of the "neo-serfdom" in Rumania, the feudal residues in agriculture had to be cleared away first; a land reform should create independent peasant properties and open the door for capitalism. See Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 276-279.

52. Ivo Banac (ed.), *The Effects of World War I: The Class War after the Great War: The Rise of Communist Parties in East Central Europe, 1918-1921* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983).

53. Albert Hirschman, "Underdevelopment, Obstacles to the Perception of Change, and Leadership," in Albert Hirschman, *A Bias for Hope. Essays on Development in Latin America* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), 336-337.

54. Alexander Gerschenkron, "Some Aspects of Industrialization," 219.

55. Cited by David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant*, 39.

56. Thus in a series of articles entitled "Social Democracy or Populism" (1907), M. Stere drew the political consequences of the establishment of a true democracy in Rumania, where 94 % of the taxpayers at the time were peasants, namely - the establishment of a "rural democracy," the orientation of the state toward the peasant - see David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania. The War and Agrarian Reform (1917-21)* (London: Oxford University Press-New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 555.

57. Aleksander Stamboliiski, *Politicheski partii ili suslovni organizatsii (Political Parties or Estatist Organizations)* (Sofia, 1945), 183-186, 224-226. See a summary of his theory in John Bell, "Alexander Stamboliiski and the Theory and Practice of Agrarianism in Bulgaria," in Thomas Butler, (ed.), *Bulgaria. Past and Present*, 80-85.

58. David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant*, 460.

59. David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant*, 107.

60. See John Bell, "Alexander Stamboliiski and the Theory," 85-86. On the functions ascribed to cooperatives, see also David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant*, 113-117.

61. Virgil Madgearu, *Agrarianism, Capitalism, Imperialism* (Bucharest, 1936), 33-37, 136-138. Later he modified his views, according capitalism an ever-increasing role in the economy of the country. See Keith Hitchins, "Gindirea," 146-147.

62. Virgil Madgearu, "Doctrina Taraneasca" (The Peasantist Doctrine), in *Doctrinile Partidelor Politice* (Bucharest, 1923), 85 (cited by Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 150-151).

63. John Bell, "Alexander Stamboliiski and the Theory," 78-90, esp. 86.

64. About the outcome of the land reform in Rumania, see David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant*, esp. 220-226, Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 47-55; about the results of the land reform in Yugoslavia, see Joso Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press: 1955), 369-410; about the land reforms in general, see David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant*, 89-98.

65. David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant*, 94.

66. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), 72-78.

67. John Lampe, "Belated Balkan Modernization," 26-29. About Bulgarian peasant populism, see also Nicos Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery*, 35-38.

68. Richard Crampton, "Modernization: Conscious, Unconscious and Irrational," in Roland Schoenfeld (ed.), *Industrialisierung und gesellschaftlicher Wandel*, 128-129.

69. For the case of Bulgaria, such a view has been expressed by John Bell, "Alexander Stamboliiski and the Theory and Practice," 86.

70. Holm Sundhaussen, "Die verpasste Agrarrevolution. Aspekte der Entwicklungsblokade in den Balkanländer vor 1945," in Roland Schoenfeld (ed.), *Industrialisierung und gesellschaftlicher Wandel*, 45-60.

71. Dieter Senghaas, *The European Experience. A Historical Critique of Development Theory* (Leamington, New Hampshire: Berg Publishers, 1985), esp. 46-54.

72. Richard Crampton, "Modernization: Conscious, Unconscious and Irrational," 129.

73. On this point I agree with the judgment of Nicolas Spulber. See Nicolas Spulber, "Changes in the Economic Structures," 374-375. For a very negative view about the compatibility of peasantry with modern democracy in particular (though qualified for commercial agriculture), see Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), esp. 422-429.

74. David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant*, 28-30, 49-52; Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 142-143.

75. About Slavophilism and its pan-Slavist developments, see Seton-Watson, R. "Panslavism," in Seton-Watson, R. *Europe in the Melting-Pot* (London: Macmillan, 1919), 207-224. About the (rather restricted) impact of Slavophilism in the Balkans, see Traian Stoianovich, "The Pattern of Serbian," 259-260; Cyril Black, "Russia and Modernization," 166.

76. Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 143-148; David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant*, 39-40; Keith Hitchens, "Gindirea," 143-144.

77. Bulgarian examples are Konstantin Petkanov, "Kharakterni cherti na bulgariana," in Mincho Draganov (ed.), *Narodopsikhologija na bulgarite*, 538-548; Stoian Kosturkov, *Vurkhu psihologijata na bulgarina* (Sofia, 1949).

78. Traian Stoianovich, "The Pattern of Serbian," 257-260.

79. Dimitur Avramov, *Dialog mezhdu dve izkustva*.

80. Vivian Pinto, "The Civic and Aesthetic Ideal of Bulgarian Narodnik Writers," in *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXXII (June, 1954): 355.

81. Bulgarian narodnichestvo included authors as Todor Vlaikov, Tsanko Tserkovski, Konstantin Maksimov, Petko Todorov, Anton Strashimirov, N. Filipov, etc. Civic ideals about the role of the intelligentsia were elaborated in articles as well. See P. Deborov, "Inteligentsiata v Bulgaria," in *Bulgarska sbirka*, II, 9, Sofia, 1895; Nikola Gabrovski, *Nravstvenata zadacha na inteligentsiata* (Sofia, 1889); Todor Vlaikov, *Niakolko misli za narodniia uchitel kato uchitel i na obshtestvoto* (Plovdiv, 1891); Todor Vlaikov, "Nashata Inteligentsia," in *Demokraticheski pregled*, 18:5 (1926): 289-309; Todor Vlaikov, "Chovekut ot inteligentsiata," in *Prosveta*, 4:2 (1938): 140-143; Krustiu Krustev, "Bulgarskata inteligentsia," in *Misul*, 8, 1898, 3-13. In these and other articles the intelligentsia was severely criticized for falling short of these ideals and neglecting the fulfillment of its public tasks.

82. On a more abstract level traditionalism (conservatism, reaction) as well as modernism (and post-modernism) can be regarded as expressions of a "politics of time." See Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde* (London: Verso, 1995), IX-XIV. Modernity is defined here as a category of "historical consciousness" connected with the temporalization of experience; "a form of historical time, which valorizes the new as the product of constantly self-negating temporal dynamic" (p. XII).

83. One of the most speculative Rumanian historical theories was that of the Roman origin of the Rumanian people. See John Campbell, "The Influence of Western Political Thought," 264-265.

84. Bulgarian materials of this trend were collected by Ivan Elenkov and Roumen Daskalov (eds.), *Zashito sme takiva? Eseta vurkhu bulgarskata kulturna identichnost* (Sofia: Prosveta, 1995). The texts are commented by the editors in the introduction.

85. This presentation is based on Keith Hitchins, "Gindirea," 143-173.

86. Similar Hungarian doctrines ("Turanism" and "Hungarianism") are considered by Andrew Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary*, 274-278.

87. Ianko Ianev, "Iztok ili Zapad," in *Zlatorog*, 14:4 (1933): 178.

88. Ianko Ianev, "Iztok ili Zapad", 180. The influence of Oswald Spengler is easily discernible in the terminology; it is mixed with racial elements.

89. Naiden Sheitanov, "Svetovna Bulgaria," in *Zlatorog*, 7:4 (1926): 168-176.

90. Ianko Ianev, "Probuzhdane," in *Zlatorog*, 11, 5-6 (1930): 273-277, 282-283.

91. Naiden Sheitanov, "Sudbata na slavianstvoto," in *Zlatorog*, 11:2 (1930): 95, 100.

92. Roumen Daskalov, "Building up a National Identity: The Case of Bulgaria," *EUI Working Papers*, no. 94/11 (Florence: European University Institute, 1994).

93. Dimitur Avramov, "Dvizhenieto 'Rodno Izkustvo'," 205-245.

94. H. Mancilla, *Die Trugbilder der Entwicklung*, 155; As Anthony Smith suggested apropos of some African nations, national identities may develop as a sort of cultural compensation of newer nations *vis-à-vis* technological and economic superiority of the West. See Anthony Smith, "A Europe of Nations – or the Nation of Europe?," in *Journal of Peace Research*, 30, 1993.

95. About such examples in Islam and in the Third world in general, see H. Mancilla, *Die Trugbilder der Entwicklung*, 145-149.

96. Thus Richard Johnson notes the enhanced need for identity when a group is faced with "national" non-recognition, resulting at times in challenging inversions of the dominant evaluations ("black nation," "queer nation" in the U.S.A.) – Richard Johnson, "Towards a Cultural Theory of the Nation," 215-216.

97. See H. Mancilla, *Die Trugbilder der Entwicklung*, 160-161.

98. Bulgarian political organizations with a more unambiguously fascist character were: Aleksandur Tsankov's "Narodno Sotsialno Dvizhenie" ("Popular Social Movement"), the Union "Bulgarska Rodna Zashitita" ("Bulgarian Motherland Defense") and the "Union of the Bulgarian National Legions," all formed in the late 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s as well as some others, formed during the war – the Ratniks (eventually the Branniks). All were extreme nationalist (some with racist elements), demanded above-party national unity and were organized on the Führer-principle; only the Union "Bulgarska Rodna Zashitita" defined itself expressly as fascist. Tsankov's "Narodno Sotsialno Dvizhenie" was the biggest among them; it was in favor of strong state intervention in the economy and for class cooperation. There have been debates on the character of some "rightist" or militarist organizations of the early 1920s ("Naroden Zgovor," "Voenna Liga," "Kubrat") – while they have been defined as fascist in earlier works, this has been qualified or rejected afterwards. On fascism in Bulgaria, see Vladimir Migeve, *Utvurzhdavane na monarkho-fashistkata diktatura v Bulgariia 1934-1936 g.* (Sofia, 1977); Stefan Radulov, "Osnovni techeniia v bulgarskiiia fashizm," in *Izvestiia na instituta po istoriia na BKP*, vol. 63, 1989; Velichko Georgiev, *Narodniat Zgovor* (Sofia, 1989); Zh. Kolev, *Sujuz na bulgarskite natsionalni legioni* (Sofia, 1976); Plamen Tsvetkov, Nikolai Poppetrov, "Kum tipologiiata na politicheskoto razvitiie n Bulgariia prez 30-te godini," in *Istoriicheski pregled*, 1990, no. 2; Vladimir Migeve, "Politicheskata sistema v Bulgariia ot 9 iuni 1923 do 9 septemvri 1944," in *Istoriicheski pregled*, 1990, no. 2.

99. About fascism in Yugoslavia, see Dimitrije Djordjevic, "Fascism in Yugoslavia: 1918-1941," in Peter Sugar (ed.), *Native Fascism in the Successor States 1918-1945* (Santa Barbara, California, 1971), 125-134; Ivan Avakumovic, "Yugoslavia's Fascist Movements, in Peter Sugar (ed.), *Native Fascism*, 135-143. See also the synthesis by Peter Sugar, "Conclusion," in Peter Sugar (ed.), *Native Fascism*, 147-156.

100. David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant*, 122.

101. About fascism in Rumania, see Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 223-241; Eugen Weber, "Romania," in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds.), *The European Right*, 501-574; Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Fascism in Romania," in Peter Sugar (ed.), *Native Fascism*, 112-121; Eugen Weber, "Romania," in Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism* (Malabar, Florida: Robert Krieger Publishing Company, 1982), 96-105.

102. Peter Sugar points to the role of religion and the idea of a "corporative-Christian" state as a peculiar trait of fascism in Eastern Europe. See Peter Sugar, "Conclusion," 151-152.

103. Henry Roberts, *Rumania*, 223, 225.

104. *Ibid.*, 231.

105. See Peter Sugar, "Conclusion," 150-153.

106. Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, 21-24.

107. Mihail Manoilescu, *Le Siècle du corporatisme* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1934).

About his ideas, see Philippe Schmitter, "Reflections on Mihail Manoilescu and the Political Consequences of Delayed-Dependent Development on the Periphery of Western Europe," in Kennet Jowitt (ed.), *Social Change in Romania*, 117-139. On fascist and national socialist ideas about "social control" of property and organization of the economy toward the "nation's needs," see Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, 49-53.

108. The commonality between fascism and socialism on the plane of collectivistic ideas (planning, direction, compulsion, taxation) reaching to a kind of state socialism is noted by Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, 24-25, 42-43. On the other hand, fascism differs from communism and socialism (but resembles Social-Democratic and Labor movements in the West) by its nationalism on the political plane and its insistence upon class cooperation on the social plane (pp. 46, 53).

109. Henry Turner, "Fascism and Modernization," in *World Politics*, 24:4 (1972): 562. The author also contrasts German Nazism and Italian Fascism, arguing that the latter was not as backward-looking and hostile to industrialization as the former (555-559, 562-564).

110. For a treatment of European ideologies of the Right and a very perceptive analysis of the economic and social reasons for the appeal of extremist movements in Eastern Europe, see Eugen Weber, "Introduction," in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds.), *The European Right*, 1-28, esp. 10-13; For the case of Hungary, see Andrew Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary*, 218-312.

111. Peter Sugar calls the "native" East European fascism "fascism with reservations" precisely because of the "exclusions and reservations" to racism and even to nationalism, necessitated by the mixed ethnic composition of the states. See Peter Sugar, "Conclusion," 154-155. Of course, anti-Semitism was a salient feature of Rumanian fascism.

112. For an interpretation of communism and national socialism as projects superseding the economic and political designs of modernization and setting out to change (though in a different way) the world system and the international order, see Andrew Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary*, 318-320.